Traditionally, governments have taken a "command and control" approach to the management of environmental degradation. That is, they set standards - laws - that are intended to achieve environmental objectives, then monitor those who are bound by the laws, and prosecute those who fail to comply with them. There are several problems with this system. First, legally-binding standards usually express a desired level of environmental performance - for example, the quality of an industrial effluent (discharge). Pollution control technology may change rapidly, but the law remains the same. So, there is no incentive for dischargers to improve their pollution control effort as long as they are meeting current standards. Another problem with "command and control" systems is the cost of monitoring and enforcement. Although some monitoring costs can be passed on to the discharger (with auditing by the regulatory agency), the regulator must bear the high legal and administrative costs of enforcing and prosecution.
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the use of "voluntary" or "non-regulatory" approaches to pollution control. Voluntary initiatives can be used on their own or can be coupled with existing laws and policies. Examples of voluntary initiatives include negotiated agreements between a regulatory agency and an individual industry or a whole industrial sector, and "challenge" programs, in which a regulator challenges a company or sector to improve its performance in exchange for positive recognition such as awards or advertising.
As governments in Canada and the U.S. try to reduce costs and improve efficiency, voluntary initiatives are gaining prominence. However, environmental non-government organizations have expressed concern about them: they will not, after all, guarantee a particular level of environmental quality, and no sanctions will be imposed if a discharger simply ignores them. Some groups believe that legally-binding standards are fundamental to sound environmental management, and that voluntary initiatives are a waste of precious agency time and resources.
Many provincial governments and the Canadian federal government are now developing voluntary, non-regulatory initiatives for pollution control. Often, as is the case in the United States, these programs focus on industrial pollution prevention - that is, encouraging industries to use less toxic materials, produce less waste, and recycle and reuse residual wastes.
One of the best-known Canadian voluntary initiatives is the Responsible Care Program of the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association. Participants in this program must sign a commitment to manage toxics carefully, including careful "housekeeping" in manufacturing facilities, management of stored and waste materials, buy-backs for excess chemicals sold to customers, and similar initiatives. Responsible Care is now endorsed by the vast majority of Canadian chemical manufacturing firms and the program is now in place in numerous countries worldwide, including the United States and many European countries.
Other examples of recent voluntary pollution-control programs include the Automotive Manufacturing Pollution Prevention Project (MVMA Project) and the Green Clean Project, both facilitated by the Canadian Pollution Prevention Centre in conjunction with regulatory agencies and industry associations.
The MVMA project, which was announced on May 29th, 1992, is a voluntary cooperative effort between the participating member companies of the Canadian Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association (MVMA), the federal Department of the Environment (DOE) and the Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (MOEE). The project's goal is to produce a verifiable reduction of persistent toxic substances and other environmental contaminants of concern (toxic substances) used, generated or released by the participating member companies of the Canadian MVMA. Chrysler Canada, Ford Motor Company of Canada and General Motors of Canada - all major employers and significant users of toxic substances - were the first to engage in this activity in the Great Lakes Basin. The MVMA project has served as a model for other sectors and is viewed by most observers as a success story in pollution prevention.
The Green Clean Project is a cooperative effort by governments, industry and non-government environmental organizations to prevent pollution from laundry and dry cleaning operations. Participation in this project is being undertaken by the Ontario Fabricare Association (OFA), the Korean Dry Cleaners Association (KDA), Ontario Ministry of Environment and Energy (MOEE), and the Federal Department of the Environment (DOE). About ninety percent of all dry cleaners use the chlorinated solvent perchloroethylene to clean clothes, and the remainder of the industry cleans with petroleum. The Green Cleaning method does not use either of these chemicals, and instead relies on new technology and water based processes to clean garments normally dry cleaned. There are thousands of dry cleaners in Canada, virtually all of them discharging wastes into municipal sewer systems. "Command and control" regulation of those discharges would require separate by-laws in each municipality - and separate and redundant monitoring, enforcement, and prosecution efforts. The Clean Green Project employs two voluntary "codes of practice," one for the reduction of solvent emissions from dry cleaners and one for laundry operations, including planning, housekeeping, preventive maintenance, inspections and records, employee training and so on.
Voluntary programs have also been used widely for the control of soil loss and water pollution from agricultural activities, and for the misuse of municipal sewer systems. In each case, the site-specific nature of the problem makes traditional regulatory approaches difficult to impose and enforce. Voluntary programs give governments the flexibility to educate potential polluters and encourage movement toward more protective practices, without the economic burden of more formalized programs.
Voluntary initiatives have been the subject of much heated debate in the literature, in public meetings, and inside regulatory agencies. There are both pro and con arguments to be made about them.
There is no question that voluntary initiatives are cheaper to design, cheaper to administer, and cheaper to improve than traditional "command and control" regulatory approaches. Generally speaking, they are well accepted by industry so there is less acrimony in meetings, less time spent on arguing, and more time and effort spent in actually achieving pollution control. Regulatory agencies can administer voluntary initiatives with a handful of staff; whereas, dozens or even hundreds of staff may be needed to develop, monitor and enforce regulatory programs. Governments can put the money they save to use in educational programs directed at pollution prevention and similar beneficial activities.
Voluntary initiatives depend on collaboration - and cooperation - between public agencies, public interest groups, communities, and labor. When a voluntary pollution reduction program is first proposed, only the regulatory agency and one industrial sector may be involved in the discussion. But as the activity develops, especially through the implementation phase, there are opportunities for many players to become involved, both in the delivery of the project and in its improvement. This is usually a positive and productive relationship for all parties, who can benefit from the chance to learn about the perspectives and priorities of other groups. Over the long term, voluntary initiatives may therefore provide a foundation for lasting partnerships between government and industry, between industry and non-government organizations, and so on.
Probably the most frequently-cited benefit of voluntary pollution control programs is their ability to encourage flexibility and innovation. Traditional "command and control" approaches require that polluters meet the letter of the law - but need go no further. Well-structured voluntary programs, with strong incentives for participation, can encourage potential polluters to try out new or risky approaches for pollution control. Sometimes, as in the case of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association, voluntary programs have had spin-off benefits in other areas. In that case, voluntary programs for the reduction of toxic solvent use in automobile manufacturing led to better communication between the manufacturers and the suppliers of solvents. When solvent manufacturers learned of the manufacturers' needs, they worked hard to produce products that would meet those needs. The suppliers therefore benefited from increased (or at least sustained) sales, while the automotive industry was able to meet voluntary commitments to reduce solvent use.
One argument against voluntary pollution control programs is that they don't work unless dischargers participate. With a comprehensive regulatory framework, strictly and consistently enforced, everyone participates or sanctions follow. With voluntary programs, pollution reduction will occur only when a minimum level of participation exists. For industries where there are few facilities widely dispersed, voluntary programs may be ineffective because there isn't enough interaction between the affected facilities or enough positive reinforcement for participants.
It has sometimes been argued that voluntary programs are successful only when the affected dischargers have the money and ability to allow them to participate. Sometimes, this has meant that only larger industries, municipalities, or agricultural operations take part, because they have access to high quality technical support, necessary human resources, or simply time to implement new programs. Larger organizations can also afford to take the risks associated with introducing new technology or deviating from past practice. They may, for instance, have built up a long and solid record of environmental performance with regulatory agencies, and can "coast" on that record through a period of innovation. Smaller companies often don't have the time, money, or trained staff to let them take part in voluntary (and therefore not strictly necessary) initiatives. A small metal plating operation, for example, may employ only two or three staff. Freeing up one of those people to attend a government-sponsored training workshop may be impossible at most times of the year. Similarly, a small operation may have a more variable record with regulators - and more frequent visits from government inspectors! Such an operation may be unwilling to take the chance of attracting more negative attention, and would thus avoid any innovative or non-traditional pollution control approaches.
In an effort to construct voluntary programs that are attractive to industry, regulatory agencies may avoid specific targets for results. Instead, there may be an emphasis on the benefits of partnership-building, mutual benefits, and broad goals (e.g., "reduction of toxics") without clear objectives for individual dischargers. If this happens, it may be unclear what any one participant can or should do to meet the broad goals of the project. Voluntary programs that focus on results (e.g., a given discharger to reduce total emissions of zinc by 35% by the year 2005) may be viewed as pseudo-regulatory and therefore less palatable to potential participants. Vague goals can therefore mean better participation but less measurable results - a waste of time and money.
Participation in a voluntary program is, by definition, voluntary. The incentives for participation in such a program must therefore be strong, and this is not always the case. For instance, a government labeling program for "ecofriendly" products (such as is currently used by the Canadian government), could be a useful marketing tool for companies, and thus a strong incentive. But a simple certificate showing that a facility has participated in a voluntary program may not have the same value to a discharger, and may be less effective in encouraging participation. Similarly, sanctions must exist for those who have committed to participation, but who have not followed through on their commitments. In many voluntary programs, nothing happens to these participants, and they are thus able to benefit from the meaningful participation of other companies without themselves having to expend any time or money - or achieving any measurable pollution reduction results. If many companies promise to participate but renege on their promises, the credibility of good performers and the program overall may be adversely affected.
By definition, voluntary programs fall, outside the legal framework for environmental protection, although they are often implemented in conjunction with a regulatory program. Voluntary programs may take the form of semi-contractual agreements such as memoranda of understanding or agreement, actual contracts, or simple "handshake" agreements. Enforcement of these agreements is variable, voluntary, and has no legal implications.
Chapter 11 discusses human impact on the water cycle, including water pollution and stormwater (mis)management. Chapter 12 discusses pollution, sediments and nutrients, including long-term strategies for correction (page 312). Chapter 13 discusses more specific problems associated with sewage pollution and treatment. Chapter 14 extends that discussion to a range of hazardous chemicals and the need for pollution avoidance. Pages 365-368 describe the problem of too many or too few regulations, and the various responses of industry. Page 367 includes a description of the Responsible Care Program, which initiated in Canada, and the growing interest in green products. Chapter 14 discusses the management of air pollutants, including control strategies (page 384) and future directions in that area. Page 394 discusses the "command-and-control" strategy and difficulties implicit in its implementation. Chapter 17 includes a comprehensive discussion of pollution and public policy, including regulatory and market-based approaches to pollution control (page 439). Page 441 discusses the costs of environmental regulation. Chapter 20 talks about public policy in the context of solid waste management. Pages 520-524 contain a lengthy discussion on recycling and composting options, which are often components of a voluntary waste reduction program. Pages 424-425 talk about the need to emphasize changes in personal behaviour - again, an important component of voluntary programs.
There is very little formally published on "voluntary initiatives" or "non-regulatory programs," although there is much debate on this subject in environmental policy circles. "Pollution prevention" information is, however, widely available, and most pollution prevention programs are voluntary in nature. Some key references in this area are listed below. There is also a large literature on economic instruments for pollution control (for instance, taxes, economic incentives, "feebates" and so on), but these tools are not generally considered voluntary, because most are linked to regulatory requirements.
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